
Improving NVRA Compliance in State Social Service Agencies is Associated with Significant Increases in Registration and Voting for Women SNAP Participants

Several times in the past year, I have received questions about the effectiveness of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and the value of efforts to improve state compliance with Section 7 of the Act, which requires states to offer voter registration services at their agencies managing SNAP, Medicaid, WIC, TANF, and similar programs.¹ (Appendix A reviews Section 7's requirements, state noncompliance, and interventions to enforce the Act.)

Since 2000, nearly two dozen states have signed agreements to settle or avoid litigation for failing to comply with Section 7's voter registration mandate. Because tens of millions of adult citizens apply for or participate in Section 7 programs each year, improved Section 7 registration programs could result in tens or hundreds of thousands of additional votes.

Civil rights organizations have shown that initiatives to enforce state compliance with Section 7 can dramatically increase the number of voter registration applications (VRAs) from these agencies—see Appendix B. However, prior studies have not explored interventions' effects on registration and turnout rates, the ultimate outcomes of interest. **This report fills that gap by summarizing new research making innovative use of the Current Population Survey (CPS).**

I find that Section 7 interventions are associated with marked increases in agency output, five to six points in the registration rate, and about three points in turnout for women from SNAP-participating households.

Given the narrow margin of victory in some elections, the implications of improved Section 7 performance for the electoral power of women with low incomes are substantial. For instance, less than 12,000 votes determined the 2020 presidential election in both Arizona and Georgia, the Nevada 2022 US Senate election, and several recent elections for the US House. In short, “If the presidential election of 2000 taught us anything, it is that ... small differences in turnout can make an enormous difference to the nation's politics.”²

¹ For brevity, I use the phrases Section 7, health and human services, social services, and agency registration interchangeably for agencies implementing SNAP (aka “food stamps”), WIC, Medicaid, and TANF. While Section 7 also covers some disability services, armed forces recruitment centers, and agencies that states select, these sources register relatively very few people.

² Citrin, Jack, Eric Schickler, and John Sides. 2003. “What If Everyone Voted? Simulating the Impact of Increased Turnout in Senate Elections.” *American Journal of Political Science* 47(1): 75–90, page 88. I do not explore in this report the connection between increased registration, turnout, and electoral power or policy decisions. However, many civic organizations strive to make such connections in their work. Additional research is needed to update prior literature examining such linkages.

Potential Size of Section 7 Registration Programs

- Each year, state agencies covered by Section 7 interact with tens of millions of adult citizens, and participants in these programs have voter registration rates over twenty percentage points below that of wealthy citizens—see Table 1.
- Women comprise two-thirds and non-whites fifty-four percent of those who report registering to vote at agencies covered by Section 7—see Table 2.

Contrary to claims that Section 7 agencies register few people, states complying with the law can produce from tens of thousands to more than two hundred thousand registration applications from these agencies in an election cycle. Consider the following examples comparing the number of VRAs produced by state social service agencies before and after Section 7 enforcement efforts:

- After Alabama signed an agreement in 2014, social service VRAs jumped several-fold to nearly 70,000 in 2014 and 120,000 in 2016, accounting for 16 percent of all applications in 2014 and 10 percent in 2016.³
- Missouri social services agencies filed less than 18,000 VRAs in both 2004 and 2006. After a court order and settlement agreement concerning Section 7 compliance, agencies produced more than 340,000 VRAs over the subsequent four cycles (or about 85,000 per cycle).
- In Ohio, agency VRAs went from 42,000 in the 2004 election cycle to an average of more than 260,000 per cycle after the state settled Section 7 litigation. Roughly 10 percent of all registration applications in Ohio come from these agencies.
- In Tennessee, following enforcement actions by the Justice Department in 2002, the total number of Section 7 VRAs ranged from 120,000 to 174,000 for each of the subsequent four cycles. In 2004, 16 percent of all registration applications were from these agencies.
- In Texas, Section 7 VRAs skyrocketed from a few thousand in 2008 and 2010 to an average of nearly 250,000 for each of the next five election cycles following an intervention (nine percent of all registration applications received in the 2014 cycle).

Do Agency-Registered Citizens Vote?

- Turnout in presidential election cycles among people registering at social service agencies ranges from 70 to 80 percent—see Table 3. Although this rate is roughly ten to 15 points below the average of those registering by other methods, it remains substantial.
- Among registered non-voters, people who registered at a social service agency are more likely than others to report that a disability or transportation was a barrier to voting—see

³ These five examples use data states reported to the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC). See also Table 5.

Table 4. Thus, turnout for these citizens would likely benefit from additional mobilization efforts targeting their particular needs.

Impact on Agency Registrations

Under this and the following two headings, I summarize the association of NVRA interventions with changes in (a) where people registered, (b) registration status, and (c) voting. These associated changes are based on statistical models using CPS data covering ten federal elections (2002 to 2020). See Appendix C for details regarding the data and methods and how combining the November and December CPS Supplements identifies adult citizens from households participating in SNAP—i.e., those most likely affected by Section 7 agreements.

- **When Section 7 compliance agreements are in effect, compared to when agreements were being negotiated or compliance litigated, the percentage of adult citizens from households participating in SNAP who report that they registered at a social services agency increases by nearly two-thirds (65 percent).**
- This finding is highly statistically significant ($p < .01$) and supports prior findings on the substantial impact of interventions on Section 7 output (i.e., VRAs produced)—see also Table 5, Figure 1, and Appendix B.

Impact on Registration Rates

- Compared to election cycles before interventions, **the registration rate for women from households participating in SNAP rises 4.7 points during agreement periods and 6 points in the first two cycles after agreements ended** ($p < .01$ for both findings).
- Given the millions of citizens in these states participating in SNAP, a five percent increase in registration translates into hundreds of thousands of newly registered women.
- In the third and fourth election cycles after agreements ended, the increase is smaller and not as statistically significant: 3.2 points compared to pre-intervention periods ($p = .11$).

The reduced registration rates several cycles after agreements expire may be due to recurring compliance problems. Indeed, after agreements expire, some states show declines in agency VRAs, and advocates have found that some states relapse into noncompliance (Appendix B).

Changes in how citizens and agencies interact over the last twenty years may also lead to declines in the NVRA's impact. For instance, as states received waivers from the USDA to reduce face-to-face interactions for SNAP applicants, the registration rate of citizens from SNAP households declines by 2.1 points ($p = .27$). Although the result is not highly statistically significant, when combined with other evidence, it suggests that agencies may not have developed or maintained NVRA-compliant practices for remote transactions (i.e., those by

phone, mail, or online).⁴ Acceptance of the registration offer may also be less likely during remote transactions. The development of automatic voter registration for these agencies might result in dramatic improvements in state compliance and citizen registration for in-person transactions and particularly for remote transactions.⁵

Impact on Voter Turnout

- Compared to cycles prior to interventions, **turnout for women from households participating in SNAP increases 2.7 points during agreement periods and 3.2 points in the first two cycles after agreements ended** ($p < .1$ for both findings).
- In the third and fourth cycles after agreements ended, compared to pre-intervention periods, there is a marginally statistically significant increase of 2.5 points in voting ($p = .199$).

Implications

- When an evidence-based policy operates at scale, research on policy impact should ask under what conditions a policy is effective or its effects might vary. Given the evidence of significant noncompliance with the NVRA, evaluations of the Act need to consider its implementation status in a specific state for a particular election cycle (i.e., implementation *conditions* policy impact).
- Despite implementation failures, the results of NVRA enforcement actions indicate that the Act can significantly increase registration and turnout.
- The evidence for an impact on voter turnout is not as strong as the evidence for an effect on registration. However, many factors besides access to registration affect turnout. Notably, agency-registered citizens are more likely than others to state that disability and transportation problems are reasons for not voting (see **Table 4**).
- Thus, turnout assistance tailored to this population merits additional attention from civic groups.
- Given the narrow margin of victory in some recent elections and the size of agencies involved, properly implemented NVRA Section 7 registration programs could have substantial implications for the electoral power of women with low incomes.

⁴ Regarding widespread noncompliance with the NVRA in states' online SNAP applications, see Ashbrook, Alexandra, Sarah Brannon, and Douglas R Hess. 2017. *A Review of National Voter Registration Act Compliance in SNAP Applications*. Washington, DC: Project Vote & Food Research and Action Center. Available at <https://bit.ly/42yJRoD>

⁵ See Institute for Responsive Government. 2023. "Colorado Medicaid SAVR: A Significant Opportunity to Improve Registration Rates." Available at <https://bit.ly/3J7bo9A>.

- The success of Section 7 litigation demonstrates an aspect of NVRA effectiveness that observers often overlook: the right to private action in the NVRA. I.e., the right of private plaintiffs to bring litigation against states to ensure compliance has been essential to the Act's impact in numerous states.

Tables and Figures

Table 1. Registration rates.

| | Reg. Rate |
|---------------------|------------------|
| Top income quartile | 88.8 |
| Bottom quartile | 70.4 |
| SNAP households | 64.9 |
| WIC households | 61.5 |

Source: Current Population Survey, 2002 to 2020 average. Quartiles approximate.

Table 2. Who registers at social service agencies?

| Race/Ethnicity | Men | Women | Total |
|-----------------------|------------|--------------|--------------|
| White | 36% | 64% | 46% |
| Black | 27 | 73 | 30 |
| Latino | 32 | 68 | 18 |
| Asian/PI | 41 | 59 | 3 |
| Native American | 36 | 64 | 1 |
| Multi-racial | 28 | 72 | 2 |
| Total | 33 | 67 | 100 |

Source: Current Population Survey, 2006 to 2020 averages.

Table 3. Turnout by method of voter registration.

| How Registered to Vote | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| At a Social Services Agency | 75% | 82% | 70% | 76% | 83% |
| All Other Methods & Locations | 89% | 90% | 88% | 88% | 93% |

Source: Current Population Survey.

Table 4. Reasons why registered citizens did not vote by registration method, 2014 to 2020.

| Reason why registered citizen did not vote | How Registered to Vote | | |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------|------------|
| | All Other Methods & Locations | At a Soc. Agency | Difference |
| Illness or disability (own or family's) | 11.3 | 15.6 | 4.3 |
| Out of town or away from home | 9.1 | 6.5 | -2.6 |
| Forgot to vote (or send in absentee ballot) | 6.4 | 9.9 | 3.5 |
| Not interested, felt my vote wouldn't matter | 16.2 | 19.1 | 2.8 |
| Too busy, conflicting work or school schedule | 24.9 | 17.2 | -7.7 |
| Transportation problems | 2.5 | 7.1 | 4.7 |
| Didn't like candidates or campaign issues | 11.6 | 6.8 | -4.8 |
| Registration problems (i.e., didn't receive mail ballot) | 3.5 | 3.7 | 0.2 |
| Bad weather conditions | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.1 |
| Inconvenient polling place or hours or lines too long | 2.8 | 1.6 | -1.2 |
| Other reason* | 11.3 | 12.1 | 0.7 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | |

Source: Current Population Survey. *Note:* *Includes, for 2020, concerns about COVID-19.

Table 5. Agency VRAs.

| | 2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 | 2018 | 2020 |
|----|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| AL | 13,621 | | | 22,912 | 19,059 | <u>4,986</u> | 69,366 | 119,261 | 52,094 | 39,093 |
| AZ | 9,351 | 11,347 | 5,323 | 11,528 | 16,694 | 15,224 | 17,063 | 13,135 | <u>8,125</u> | 8,059 |
| CA | 45,976 | 56,034 | 20,355 | 16,622 | <u>46,630</u> | <u>115,746</u> | 84,247 | 274,329 | 77,183 | 177,354 |
| FL | <u>59,460</u> | 83,679 | 13,436 | <u>35,444</u> | 13,707 | <u>15,671</u> | 10,420 | 38,040 | 40,860 | 31,752 |
| GA | 35,802 | 51,892 | 35,747 | 21,762 | 279 | 17,790 | 34,588 | 39,826 | 23,656 | 16,419 |
| IL | 13,891 | 10,398 | 8,948 | 10,708 | 54,138 | 76,470 | 58,292 | 63,014 | 82,400 | 145,211 |
| IN | 13,281 | 15,071 | 6,023 | 2,519 | 20,489 | 52,845 | 41,865 | 41,496 | 24,510 | 20,059 |
| LA | 10,522 | 7,391 | 12,278 | 8,688 | 11,212 | 29,233 | 29,268 | 34,671 | 39,888 | 32,529 |
| MA | 13,521 | 7,092 | | | | 14,471 | 15,414 | 54,940 | 35,857 | 30,202 |
| MO | 34,923 | 17,637 | 15,568 | <u>45,402</u> | 121,037 | 103,215 | 72,617 | 67,436 | 36,909 | 28,750 |
| MS | 21,242 | 245 | 3,309 | 4,521 | <u>8,378</u> | 32,109 | 27,677 | 22,315 | 14,510 | 13,407 |
| NC | 23,781 | 19,798 | 11,607 | 78,509 | 72,128 | 91,332 | 33,332 | <u>80,601</u> | 49,613 | 56,882 |
| NJ | 11,611 | 24,501 | 5,423 | | 409 | 18,348 | | 37,478 | 34,751 | 5,650 |
| NM | 3,719 | | 1,214 | <u>1,428</u> | | 11,211 | 26,941 | 12,863 | 16,665 | 12,437 |
| NV | 39,444 | 6,389 | 3,307 | 4,301 | 1,677 | <u>9,057</u> | <u>29,316</u> | 50,342 | 34,823 | 38,576 |
| OH | 24,391 | 38,821 | <u>42,599</u> | <u>116,844</u> | 246,923 | 399,214 | 197,842 | 322,889 | 234,694 | 214,770 |
| OK | 9,633 | 15,535 | 12,724 | 12,485 | 11,525 | 11,122 | 6,096 | 43,481 | 33,061 | 16,688 |
| PA | 16,207 | 30,752 | 7,266 | 6,390 | 4,179 | <u>2,385</u> | 127,277 | 140,673 | 74,203 | 76,897 |
| RI | 2,240 | | 1,876 | 676 | 707 | | | | | |
| TN | 52,373 | 173,927 | 120,962 | 158,935 | 124,709 | 80,347 | 85,935 | 69,758 | 47,315 | 25,085 |
| TX | 97,644 | 66,866 | 17,034 | 6,338 | 3,334 | 219,688 | 433,721 | 237,318 | 196,317 | 152,724 |
| VA | 15,817 | 8,807 | 7,030 | 9,008 | 23,026 | 42,698 | 14,497 | 16,540 | 6,031 | 6,677 |

Sources: VRAs from FEC (2002) and EAC (2004-2020). Notes: Missing data are when states did not report to the EAC. Underlined data indicate election cycles covered significantly by negotiations (or litigation) about Section 7 compliance. Bold data represent election cycles covered significantly by Section 7 compliance agreements. Post-agreement cycles are to the right of those in bold. Some states do not have a negotiation period because agreements began in the same cycle as negotiations. For a description of intervention periods, see Appendix A and Appendix C. Florida's report to the EAC of a single VRA in 2014 was replaced with 127,277 VRAs as reported to plaintiffs.

Figure 1A. Agency VRAs per SNAP Household by State, Election Cycle, and Intervention Period.



Source: VRAs from FEC (2002) and EAC (2004-2020). SNAP household data from USDA. Missing data are when states did not report to the EAC.
 Notes: See Appendix A and Appendix C for a description of intervention periods. Some states do not have a negotiation period because agreements began in the same cycle as negotiations. Florida’s report to the EAC of a single in 2014 was replaced with 127,277 VRAs as reported to plaintiffs. See Table 5 for the raw number of VRAs.

Figure 2B. Agency VRAs per SNAP Household by State, Election Cycle, and Intervention Period.



Source: VRAs from FEC (2002) and EAC (2004-2020). SNAP household data from USDA. Missing data are when states did not report to the EAC.

Notes: See Appendix A and Appendix C for a description of intervention periods. Some states do not have a negotiation period because agreements began in the same cycle as negotiations. See Table 5 for the raw number of VRAs.

Appendix A: NVRA Section 7, State Violations, & Enforcement Interventions

Section 7 of the NVRA (52 USC § 20506) requires state agencies managing SNAP, Medicaid, WIC, TANF, and similar means-tested programs to offer voter registration services when people apply for benefits, recertify their eligibility, or report a change of address. The NVRA does not apply to six states. Five are exempt because they adopted Election Day Registration before 1996: Idaho, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. North Dakota is the sixth exempt state because, unique among the states, it does not use a traditional voter registration system.

In 2004, after uncovering noncompliance with Section 7 in several states, two national nonprofit organizations, Project Vote and Dēmos, began offering technical assistance to states willing to improve compliance and, eventually, litigation in states that would not comply voluntarily. These two organizations were later joined by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the ACLU, and other state and national civic organizations. Although private plaintiffs initiated most enforcement actions leading to agreements this century, the DOJ's Voting Section has also engaged states in Section 7 compliance actions.

Evidence of state noncompliance with Section 7 is too extensive and diverse to include here. In brief, the DOJ and advocates deemed performance data indicating zero or implausibly few registration applications from states, counties, or office sites for extended periods as a solid initial indicator of compliance problems. Additional evidence gathered by the DOJ and advocates included in-person surveys of office sites. These investigations frequently found offices without voter registration applications and employees unaware that they were to offer registration services. Agency paperwork, manuals, procedures, and depositions of agency employees and election officials during litigation also revealed failures to comply with or oversee compliance with Section 7 in many states.

Remarkably, between 2002 and 2020, at least twenty-two states—half of the states covered by the NVRA—have been parties, in different years and for varying numbers of years, to binding agreements to settle NVRA-enforcement litigation or comprehensive compliance-improvement plans to avoid litigation. For simplicity, I refer to all Section 7-related settlements, court orders, memoranda of understanding, or comprehensive plans as simply “agreements.” Table 5 lists the states where interventions resulted in agreements between 2002 and 2020. This list continues to grow and includes states that operated under an agreement more than once in the past two decades. I count the comprehensive voluntary compliance plans North Carolina and Virginia developed with advocates in 2008 as agreements. When agreements began several months before November in an election year or extended multiple quarters into a new election cycle, I code those cycles as agreement periods. I treat the few agreements or plans without an end date as if they lasted four years (the longest agreements with end dates), allowing for the study of possible impact decays.

For this study, I excluded interventions that involved providing states (such as Colorado, Iowa, and Michigan) with technical assistance when they did not result in an agreement. I excluded these

cases because they are less well documented and vary significantly in the changes engendered. Instead, my analysis compares periods over the life cycle of agreement-focused interventions for 22 states over ten federal election cycles. However, as discussed next, advocates have documented increases in output following interventions that consisted solely of technical assistance.

Appendix B. Agency Output & Section 7 Interventions

Three sources of data have been used to assess the impact of Section 7 interventions on social service agency output—that is, the number of voter registration applications (VRAs) from these agencies. The first source is the biennial data provided by states to the US Election Assistance Commission and published in its reports (<https://bit.ly/EACreports>).⁶ Table 5 provides the VRA data for the 22 states analyzed in this report. The second data source comes from state election agencies that regularly publish VRA numbers by source (motor voter programs, mail-in applications, Section 7, etc.) and often by month and county (or local jurisdiction). Finally, Section 7 agreements required officials to collect and report monitoring data—usually monthly data by office or county—to plaintiffs.

Reports, too numerous to list here, by Project Vote (<http://www.projectvote.org>) and Dēmos (<http://www.demos.org>) have used data from these sources to document increases in voter registration applications (VRAs) following technical assistance or agreements to improve Section 7 compliance.

In this appendix, I use EAC data to (1) visually depict the impact of agreements on agency output—see Figure 1A and 1B and Table 5—and (2) test the association of agreements with agency output in a statistical model. See the main body of this report regarding the association between interventions and an additional measure of agency output (CPS respondents reporting that they registered at a social service agency).

To visually demonstrate the effect of interventions on agency output, Figure 1A and 1B display state cycles with bars color-coded for the intervention periods described in Appendix C. To simplify the figure, I combine the first and second sets of two-cycle post-agreement periods into one color. To adjust the number of VRAs for state population size, I divide the number of VRAs (displayed in raw form in Table 5) in a state’s cycle by the number of SNAP households in the last fiscal year overlapping that cycle for that state. SNAP households are a rough proxy for Section 7 program size as it neither includes other programs nor applicants not deemed eligible.

These figures demonstrate three notable phenomena. First, NVRA Section 7 performance fluctuates within states over time. Second, these patterns are asynchronous across states. For example, as Ohio’s performance measure rose, Tennessee’s fell. Third, agency VRAs rise following interventions and sometimes decline after agreements expire.

⁶ Prior to 2004, this data was collected and reported by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).

To assess the impact of interventions on VRAs while controlling for other factors, I use a mixed-effects negative binomial count model. I include in the model state and cycle (i.e., year) indicators as well as control variables for state population, swing states (in presidential elections), automatic voter registration policies at motor vehicle departments, Election Day/Same Day Registration policy, policies waiving in-person SNAP applications, and the number of SNAP households (as an exposure variable). As with the CPS analysis, the EAC models cover ten election cycles (2002 to 2020) for 22 states (with 15 missing state-cycles).

Based on this model, **compared to pre-intervention periods, agreement periods are associated with an average increase of nearly 59,000 VRAs per state per cycle.** The 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of agreements is 32,000 to 86,000 VRAs. The predicted change is highly statistically significant ($p < .001$).

On average, there is a decline of approximately 30,000 VRAs ($p < .01$) during the first two cycles (combined) after agreements expire. From the two cycles to the next two cycles after agreements expire, there is a further decline of nearly 25,000 VRAs ($p < .01$). Thus, while there are roughly 30,000 more VRAs on average in the first two post-agreement cycles compared to pre-intervention cycles ($p < .01$), the average number of VRAs per state per cycle returns to the pre-intervention level after that.

Also worth noting is that waiving the requirement for in-person SNAP applications is associated with a decrease of about 18,000 VRAs ($p = .12$).

Appendix C. CPS Data and Method

My statistical analysis of where people registered, registration status, and turnout uses the predicted marginal changes in these three measures from cross-sectional time-series models using logistic regression and robust standard errors. As with the EAC analysis, the CPS models cover ten election cycles (2002 to 2020) for 22 states with agreements during that time frame. I use data from the November Supplement, which includes questions about registration and turnout, and the December Supplement, which contains questions about participation in SNAP, aka “food stamps.”⁷ Merging individuals’ responses from the November and December CPS Supplements is possible because the CPS is a monthly survey that adds and drops a cohort of households each month. Selected households are included in the CPS for four consecutive months. Thus, in theory, 75 percent of households should match between November and December. In practice, I matched 72 percent of adult citizens across the two months for these years (96 percent of the ideal match).

⁷ Data are from Flood, Sarah, et al. 2023. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 10.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota/IPUMS. <https://doi.org/10.18128/D030.V10.0>. Matching across months in the CPS relies on methods discussed in Flood, Sarah M., and José Pacas. 2017. “Using the Annual Social and Economic Supplement as Part of a Current Population Survey Panel.” *Journal of Economic and Social Measurement* 42(3–4): 225–48.

I developed state-cycle-level variables for NVRA interventions based on court records, agreements, and other litigation-related documents from advocacy groups and the DOJ. Due to similarities in the content of agreements and in the way interventions unfolded in each state, I assign states by cycle to one of five periods in an “intervention life-cycle”: a pre-intervention period (cycles after 2000 but before an intervention), a negotiation period (cycles during which or after plaintiffs send a notice letter to a state, but before an agreement is reached), an agreement period (when agreements are in effect), a first post-agreement period (defined as two election cycles following the end of an agreement), and a second post-agreement period (defined as another two cycles). After the second two-cycle post-agreement period, cycles are returned to the “pre-intervention” code. If agreements began several months before November in an election year or extended several months into a new election cycle, I code those cycles as agreement periods. Table 5 indicates the results of this coding protocol.

Individual-level variables derived from the CPS are those commonly used in registration and turnout studies: gender, income, education, race, and time at address. In addition to the individual-level variables and indicators for intervention periods, the models control for state and year effects. Other state-level variables are those mentioned in Appendix B for the EAC model. Finally, I included as continuous variables the number of SNAP households and state and local expenditures on social service agencies per capita (adjusted for partial state economic parity). State-level variables measures factors that may directly or indirectly affect Section 7 performance by reducing the necessity to register at an agency, affecting resources available to agencies, decreasing in-office visits (hypothesized to be more conducive to registration), or altering interest in registration.

The model measures the impact of interventions on respondents’ self-reports for (a) registering at a social service agency, (b) registration status, and (c) having voted. The findings are reported in the main body of this document. Because not all CPS respondents would be affected by Section 7 interventions, the model is limited to adult citizens or women citizens from households with at least one resident participating in SNAP. N= 9,473 for where registered, 11,321 for women’s registration rate, and 11,476 for women’s voter turnout.

The findings from the CPS models are robust to alternative specifications. Specifically, different protocols for coding Section 7 interventions result in similar findings. Moreover, other than state and cycle (year) indicators, including or excluding state-level variables has a negligible impact on the value and significance of the main predictors of interest (intervention periods). Thus, I doubt that including or excluding other registration policies is of great concern. Moreover, the findings fit with the theories of change underlying the NVRA and interventions: that is, that increased access to registration applications should increase registration rates. The findings on agency output are also confirmed with state-specific data, including qualitative evidence that many states moved from extensive noncompliance to improved compliance (states dropped noncompliant procedures, adopted compliant procedures, expanded employee training and monitoring, etc.).